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THE ROLE AND REALITY OF EMOTIONS IN LAW
CAROL SANGER*
It is a great pleasure to participate in the celebration and
exploration of Susan Bandes' The PassionsofLaw in this symposium
on emotion and gender jurisprudence.' It may be worth reminding
today's law students that when Professor Bandes and I were
classmates at the University of Michigan Law School in the mid-1970s,
there were no such conferences. Jurisprudence existed, but the
concept ofgender had not yet emerged; we were still too busy defining
feminism. Emotions were something we dutifully suppressed as we
tried to assimilate into the legal profession.
This is not to say we were wholly unaffected by the passions of
law, or at least the passions of law school. Without question, law
school had emotional content. I recall, for example, that Professor
Bandes and I experienced despair, when, as first-year students,
property grades were posted and ours were so low as to have fallen
entirely off the graph the professor sketched on the board. In contrast,
during our third year, we experienced elation when we learned we
would be earning $13,000 upon graduation: instantly wealthy, in our
view, we were unable to imagine how we would even spend such a
sum. But, our primary reaction during the three years of law school
was one of profound puzzlement. The puzzlement grew out of the
peculiar nature of our legal education - the subjects we studied, the
methods of intimidation used by the professors, and the uniformity
of those who taught - for whether our professors were venable scions
or newly hired boy-geniuses, no women ever stood before us.
I should be clear, however, that I do not characterize our puzzlement as an emotion at all, at least not ifwe take that term in its usual
(ifnow properly criticized) sense of something like pure feeling. Our
puzzlement was an entirely rational response to a world we entered
as intelligent inquisitive women, but in which we felt a sudden and
disorienting feeling of being out of place. It took a long time to figure
out why this was so, and I suspect that the process of figuring it out
explains why Professor Bandes and I both chose, after some years
of practice, to return to the scene of the crime and teach law.
Let me leave my first impressions of the relation between law,
emotion, and gender to offer instead more developed thoughts on the
topic. As a framework for this undertaking, there are four ideas to
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, New York.
1. THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
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keep in mind as we hear from today's speakers about emotions in the
workplace, in the family, and in the courts.
The first point is a question. What exactly are the properties of
an "emotion?" When we decide whether the law should treat this or
that emotion in a particular way, on what basis are we confident that
the response or behavior under consideration really is an emotion
and not something else? The response may be like a thought
(commonly understood as more cerebral, more rational), an instinct
(a response understood to be more physiological in origin), or a value
(something to be respected and encouraged). For example, when the
doctor whacks your knee with a mallet and your leg kicks straight,
you are not having an emotional reaction. On the other hand, if you
receive news of a certain kind and go "weak in the knees," you may
well be responding emotionally, as well as physiologically, even though
the origins of the response are not physical.
There are, of course, other examples of the relation between
affective response and physical manifestation. One learns something
and what follows may be a blush or a nosebleed, a smile or a heart
attack. Emotions sit poised between, not distinct from, rational
thought at the same time they are connected to the visceral. The
physical component of emotion is important in law as a matter of
proof. When law looks for evidence of emotion, outward manifestations signify. Consider a wife who calls the police and reports she
was battered. Before the call triggers the police department protocol
for battered women, the question may be whether the caller is acting
as one expert has explained a battered woman would (or should)
respond. Is she passive or is she angry? If the latter, well then, she
may not have Battered Women's Syndrome because those women are
supposed to be submissive, as the responding officer learned in
domestic violence police training.2 This "emotional profiling" may
be particularly meaningful in contexts where the outcome of an inquiry
depends on whether there is satisfactory proof that a particular
emotion existed. Did the defendant show sufficient remorse? Did
the husband act out of outrage? Was the complainant in fear for her
life?
My second point adds a dynamic gloss to the first. Determining
whether someone is having an emotional response, in contrast to a
thought, value, or physical reaction has gotten much harder to discern
in recent years. That is because we now live in an age in which
2. As Professors Schneider and Dalton explain, this requirement of a party actually being
a battered woman can be problematic when the woman's behavior may be susceptible to a
different characterization. See CLAIRE DALTON & ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN
AND THE LAW 224 n.3 (2001).
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thinking and feeling routinely blur in everyday discourse. When I
was in elementary school, lining up for recess on a fall day, our teacher
told us to "put on your coats." In the 1950s, we followed this
instruction like the obedient little Mouseketeers we were. Today,
teachers (and not only teachers in California) tell their students lining
up for recess (or whatever recess is now called) that the teacher "needs
for them to put on their coats." Their compliance now is part of a more
elaborate, quasi-therapeutic relation with their teacher. They are
meeting her needs. Another example is also taken from close to home.
When my son was in the third grade, his teacher asked him (yes, in
California) to answer the following question: Do you feel that
democracy is good? The hard part of the question for Michael was
less his views on democracy (why didn't theyjust make him king and
let it go at that?), than how to express his views in exact response
to the question asked. Thus, he wrote, "I feel that I think that
democracy is good."
These small examples are meant to suggest an increasing
socialization into having or at least displaying appropriate emotional
responses in situations once unconnected to emotional involvement.
The important question now is, "How do you feel?" We are all into
"feeling one another's pain," except typically in those cases where we
caused it. Also, note that people can be socialized into not having
the right emotional response, and here gender seems to matter a lot.
Recall Senator Edmund S. Muskie who, in 1972, cried on the campaign
trail when his family was slandered falsely. That was the end of him.
Compare him with Governor Michael Dukakis, who some sixteen years
later refused to display husbandry outrage when asked a hypothetical
question about his wife as a rape victim. He did not turn on his
feelings in response to a counterfactual. That was the end of him.
My examples have moved from behavior in primary school to
behavior in politics (which some would say is not much of a jump).
Points three and four move more specifically to law and how
expectations about emotional responses complicate notions ofjustice.
Back in the early days of the law recognizing, or being urged to
recognize, that actual people - in contrast to named parties - were
involved in the activities upon which law operates, all of us sensitive
types thought this new awareness would surely advance the cause
of fairness. Understanding that people experienced the effect oflegal
rules and that rules ought to be concerned with aspects of human
experiences previously considered outside the legal realm was a
foundational concern of the Law and Society movement and of
Feminist Jurisprudence, to name two forms of the newer scholarship.
To some extent, this has led to improvements. Sexual harassment
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law is an example. Women's displeasure with unwanted sexual
advances was re-characterized from uptight prissiness to a rational
and appropriate response grounded in a demand for equal respect
for all workers.
Now that law has discovered emotions, things are not brighter
in every instance. Consider, however, victim impact statements, one
of Professor Bandes' important and early subjects of inquiry.3 Is
justice advanced when the families ofvictims are entitled to confront
a defendant in the courtroom and damn him to hell and indignities
of prison life as part of their achieving "closure?"" The urge to find
a place for emotion in a legal regime, suddenly takes on darker
meaning, for as we see, much depends on which emotions the law
chooses to recognize, dignify, and incorporate into its processes.
Outrage gets a workout not only in victim impact statements,
but in other popularly enacted legislation, such as Megan's Law,
Kelly's Law, and Polly's Law, each aimed at increasing the penalties
or reducing the procedural protections for those who commit criminal
acts against children.5 Grief, which seems to reside close to anger,
has become a rallying principle, and the legislative response to
organized grief has been a spate oflaws, which are not only motivated
by emotion, but include as part of their scheme some emotive
component. This may be the right to confront the defendant personally,
for whatever emotional relief that provides, or to publicize his name,
in what we might understand as a modern form of branding in order
to humiliate.
This last example focuses attention on the question regarding
which of the emotions law chooses to recognize, dignify, and
incorporate. Let us assume that emotions just discussed -vengeance
and outrage - are authentic and in some contexts legitimate, even
if we might disagree with their use in a particular statute. I want
to suggest -

and this is my fourth point -

that the problem of

incorporating emotions into law is not simply that the emotions
legislators seem to find appealing may not be the ones that those of
us seeking a kinder, gentler, legal system may have had in mind.
My concern is when an emotional response is not only included in
the legal process, but required by it, emotions may lose the very
authenticity as a marker of human experience that caused scholars,
courts, and legislatures to urge attention to them in the first place.
3. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331 (1999).

4. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure:Forgiveness,Vengeance and the
Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URW. L.J. 1599 (2000).

5. See generally Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Study in
Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315 (2001).
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We seem now to have refined an array of officially approved emotions,
a list of responses deemed sufficiently worthy to be included in the
new, hipper calculus ofjustice, but which have been so well advertised
as to suggest some caution with regard to any issue we might make
of their presence or absence.
Consider the matter of remorse in a defendant's presentation
during the allocution that follows the verdict but precedes sentencing.
There is no question about what the convicted defendant is supposed
to feel, or at least is supposed to express. Now that the jury has
returned a verdict, the strategic defendant should give up any pretense
of innocence. If he does not, things are not likely to go well at
sentencing or during parole board hearings. Of course, Innocence
Projects around the country have begun to reveal unacceptable rates
of convictions in capital cases that were not only improperly obtained,
but factually wrong. The "hardened criminal" who will not demonstrate remorse may, in some cases, simply have immense integrity.
On the other hand, a convicted and guilty defendant can put on a great
show of remorse and be rewarded for the display. All of the players
now understand the "proper" emotional response and each can act
accordingly.
To illustrate the law's potential for tyranny in requiring, a
particular emotional response as part of.a legal process, I offer two
final examples from recent work ofmy own. The first example,judicial
bypass hearings for pregnant teenagers, illustrates how the law's
recognition of the emotions may, in certain circumstances, provide
only the illusion of legal responsiveness. Judicial bypass hearings
are the mandatory hearings required in about thirty states for
pregnant teenagers who want an abortion but are unwilling to notify
or obtain the consent ofone or both oftheir parents, as required under
state law. The minors may instead petition for permission from a
local judge who, at a bypass hearing, is supposed to make. a
determination about the petitioner's maturity. If she is determined
to be a mature minor, the judge is supposed to grant her request and
authorize the abortion. His decision substitutes parental consent,
and ensures that at least one adult will be involved in the minor's
decision-making process. To determine if she is mature enough, a
number of judges ask what they consider to be relevant questions
about her circumstances. These often include such questions as why
she got pregnant, whether.she knows about birth control now so that
this will not happen again,6 and why she will not involve her parents
6. In one case, the trial judge declared the minor immature because this was her second
pregnancy.
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in the process. In short, these pregnant teenagers must testify before
strangers about the most intimate facts of their lives. I develop this
argument in greater detail elsewhere7 but briefly, I suspect that the
purpose of these hearings is less an attempt to assure a sound decision
regarding the abortion than it is an attempt to humiliate young women
- in old socio-legal terms, it is an attempt to use the process itself
as punishment.' The court is supposed to be making a maturity
determination, but in looking through cases where petitions have been
denied, it is evident that something more than a display of maturity
is sought. Some indication or display of contrition or remorse is also
valued, and rewarded. Pregnant girls, and their advocates, are not
stupid, and some are able to think through and script the presentation
of self that will best accomplish the desired goal of demonstrating
whatever it takes in order to get judicial permission. This, I argue;
is a terrible misuse of emotions in law.
My second example is taken from the law and practice of open
adoption, where some contact between birth mother and the adoptive
family is central to the adoption arrangement. Open adoption grew
out of the desire for birth mothers to avoid the stark and abrupt
termination of all contact with their child, as required under
traditional (or closed) adoption, where the birth family and the
adoptive family remained complete strangers. Responding to the laws
of supply and demand, adoption agencies now routinely offer open
adoption services to their customers, partly out of concern to remain
competitive in the market. Indeed, adoptive parents are commonly
told that unless they will agree to an open adoption, they are unlikely
to be chosen by a birth mother. To be sure, there are a few agencies
that arrange only traditional closed adoptions, but they are now the
minority. In consequence, it is likely that adoptive parents may
commit to this intense involvement with their child's birth family,
and possibly to an involvement between the birth family and the child.
They do this not because it is the arrangement they prefer, but
because it is necessary to commit and exhibit the commitment in order
to get a child? This circumstance is somewhat different from the use
of emotions in the judicial bypass cases, although both cases require
7. See Carol Sanger, Compelling Narrative: Judicial Bypass Hearings and the Misuse
of Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN LOWER

COURTS (1979).
9. In one sense, the law is simply shifting which party in the adoption bears the
emotional burden. Until open adoption became both accepted and legal, the birth mother
more often bore the brunt of the burden. Now, to the extent that the arrangement is not
entirely to their liking, adoptive parents must put up contact they might not prefer, just as
birth mothers had to endure with the lack of contact or information in a closed adoption.
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an avowal, or perhaps only a display, of particular emotions to
accomplish a particular end. In the case of adoption, however, the
avowal is not just for show: the adoptive parents may be in a complex
relationship with the birth mother for some time. There is much to
learn about open adoption and its consequences for all the parties.
My point here is simply that the subject provides another example
where the outcome of a legal procedure is explicitly hinged to a
scripted emotion; here the desire to be part of a new form of blended
family and where subsequent research may show that the requirement
results in commitments to attachment that are less than authentic.

